INTRODUCTION
Computer systems, especially those in heavy-use commercial set tings, often require routine maintenance to continue functioning prop erly. Many businesses turn to an independent service organization ("IS0")2 to provide computer maintenance services because ISOs fre quently charge less than the original equipment manufacturer ("OEM") for those services.3 The tremendous growth in computer use4 has spawned a multi-billion dollar computer maintenance industry in the United States,5 and ISOs and OEMs have become engaged in fierce competition for this computer service business.6
The struggle between ISOs and OEMs to capture this expanding market has spilled over into the courts, spawning a number of recent decisions in the area of copyright law that have added significant legal consequences to the mechanics of computer operation and maintenance.
The Copyright Act defines a "computer program" as a "set of statements or instruc tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain re sult" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) .
15. Operating system software manages the internal functions of the computer and allows the computer to translate application programs that perform specific tasks, such as word processing, into language the computer can understand, making use of the ap plication software possible. See CHRISTOPH & SMITII , supra note 9, at 113-20; see also Computer Assocs. Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that "[o] perating systems are the programs that manage the resources of the computer and allocate those resources to other programs that need them"), affd., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) . For example, IBM computers use either Disk Operating System ("DOS"), Operating System 2 ("OS/2"), or UNIX software as their operating system software. See CHRISTOPH & SMITII , supra note 9, at 115-20. Microsoft Win dows software is not an operating system; it is a "software environment" that functions like an applications program. See id. Macintosh computers utilize a specialized systems program that incorporates many of the functions of Microsoft Wmdows into the operat ing software. See id.
16. Utility, diagnostic, or other computer service software often is designed to lo cate computer errors. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 113-15. Some utility software programs automatically display an error log upon being loaded into RAM in order to inform the user of any problems. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 518. Utility software is usually bundled together with operating system software so that loading of the operating system software into RAM from the permanent memory source in which it is stored necessarily involves loading the utility software. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 114.
17. See id. CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 80.
18. See id. at . No matter how the operating system might be permanently stored (i.e. in ROM, hard disk, or diskette), a computer cannot function unless the oper ating system is loaded into the computer's RAM because the operating system manages the computer's physical resources and orchestrates the execution of all programs. Thus, a computer's operating software is loaded automatically into RAM as soon as someone even the lowest-level computer maintenance involves turning on the computer and testing it to make sure that the computer functions prop erly, 19 effective computer maintenance requires loading the operating software into RAM . 20
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright infringement claim must sat isfy two eJements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unautho rized "copying" of copyrighted material.21 In Peak, the OEM had li censed copyrighted software22 to the computer owner (the "customer") under a restrictive licensing agreement that allowed the customer to use and copy the software during the normal operation of the computer but prohibited the making of any copies of the software by nonlicensed par ties.23 As a result, the court held that any copying of the software by the turns on the computer. See Arriola, supra note 3, at 407; Tr iad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *5 (noting that " [i] n order to use a Triad computer, one must reproduce the operating system software in the computer's RAM"); Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp. , 845 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D. Va. 1994) (observing that "[r] egardless of the means of loading, none of the [computer] programs can communicate with the com puter unless they are first loaded into RAM").
19. See, e.g., Tr iad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *5. In addition, proper maintenance often requires making archival copies on disk or tape in order to ensure that information stored on the computer is not lost during maintenance (i.e., when the computer is reformatted or rebooted after it has been serviced). See Tr iad I, 1994 Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 , 1162 (9th Cir. 1977 .
22. Under the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, computer programs clearly are entitled to copyright protection as literary works. See 17 U.S. C. § § 101, 117 (1994) . Of course, an OEM bringing a copyright infringement claim against an ISO must establish actual ownership of a valid copyright by showing that the software is original and that the OEM complied with the applicable statutory formalities. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 n.S (1st Cir. 1995) , affd . by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) ; Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 , 1340 (5th Cir. 1994 . For the purposes of discussion, this Note assumes that the OEM has proven ownership of a valid copyright of the software in question. expressly authorized under this License or any act which might jeopardize [MAl] 's rights or interests in the Software ... is prohibited, including without limitation, examination, disclosure, copying, modification, reconfiguration, aug mentation, adaptation, emulation, visual display or reduction to visually percepti ble form or tampering. [Vol. 95:654 IS024 without the permission of the OEM occurred "beyond the scope of the license"25 and therefore constituted copyright infringement.26
A "Peak claim" arises when: (1) an OEM transfers computer op erating software to a customer under a restrictive licensing agreement, and (2) an ISO copies the software into RAM without the OEM 's per mission or "beyond the scope of the license" while servicing the com puter.27 In other words, any third party makes an infringing "copy" of licensed operating software simply by turning on the customer's com-· puter without the OEM's permission. The Peak decision has widespread significance given the growing trend among OEMs28 to license rather than transfer ownership of software to customers.29
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) , cert.
dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994) . The terms of the license in Peak are typical of many such restrictive licensing agreements in the software industry.
24. In Peak, personnel employed by Peak Computer (the ISO) copied operating system software and diagnostic/utility software into RAM by turning on the computer while servicing MAI customers. See 991 F.2d at 517-19. The ISO then used the software, which automatically generated an error log when copied into RAM, to iden tify and correct system errors. See 991 F.2d at 517-19.
25. 991 F.2d at 517-19. The Copyright Act grants a number of exclusive rights to the holder of a copyright, including the exclusive right to make and distribute "copies" of the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) . The owner of a copyright may transfer these rights to others under an exclusive license. See 17 U.S.C. § 20 l{d) (1994).
A user infringes on the rights granted to a copyright holder by making or distributing copies of the copyrighted material without the permission of the copyright owner when such copying occurs beyond the scope of a license. See 17 U.S.C. § § 106, 50l(a) (1994); SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 , 1085 (9th Cir. 1989 28. Most OEMs own the copyright to the operating software that runs the com puters sold by the OEM. See Levin, supra note 20, at 678 n.167. Although the software developer, copyright holder, and OEM may be separate entities, generally the same en tity that manufactures a computer also will produce and hold the copyright to the oper ating software for that computer.
29. The practice of licensing rather than selling software is common across the in In a Peak situation, an OEM has two separate potential causes of action: (1) a breach of contract claim only against the customer, and (2) a copyright infringement claim against the ISO -a Peak claim. Al though this Note only addresses the copyright claim, a brief comparison of the two causes of action will help clarify the scope of the copyright claim. The breach of contract claim arises because the customer violates the terms of the license by allowing the ISO or any other unauthorized third party to use the software.30 The OEM cannot bring a breach of contract claim against the ISO because the ISO is not a party to the re strictive licensing agreement. In contrast, the OEM can bring a copy right claim only against the ISO and not against the customer because any copying performed by the customer does not occur "beyond the scope of the license. "31 The ISO only infringes on the copyright when the ISO performs the copying. Thus, no copyright cause of action acbring a copyright infringement action and argue to the court that loading software into RAM constituted "copying" under the Copyright Act, a course of action which ulti mately proved successful. See Levin, supra note 20, at 650. This note uses the term "sales" to mean sales of licenses, rather than sales of copies of the software in the § 117 sense. See infra note 31 (noting that the analysis would be different if customers were owners of copies of the software, instead of licenses).
30. Although no court has held that a customer's actions constitute a breach of contract, such a result is an obvious conclusion based on the terms of the license. How ever, aside from the financial impediments to bringing numerous individual breach of contract suits against customers, it is uhlikely that an OEM would actually pursue litiga tion against its own customers given the strong probability that doing so would drive away those customers in droves. See also infra note 122 (discussing the antitrust issues raised by such a breach of contract claim).
31. In addition, the Peak ruling does not affect customers who own, rather than hold licenses to, software. § 117 of the Copyright Act allows for "owners" of copies of computer programs to make copies of the program provided "(1) that such new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program ... or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994) . Because copying a computer program into RAM is essential in order to use the software, an ISO would not violate copyright law by loading the software into RAM if § 117 covered software held by a customer under a restrictive license agreement. How ever, in a one-sentence footnote, the court in Peak dismissed the applicability of a § 117 defense to a Peak claim by ruling that users of licensed software "do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not eligible for protection under § 117. " Peak, 991
F.2d at 518 n.5; see also Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va. 1994) . Some commentators have argued that "rightful posses sors," including licensees, should be covered under the exemptions in § 117. See, e.g., Michael E. Johnson, Note, Th e Uncertain Future of Computer Software Users' Rights in the Aft ermath of MAI Systems, 44 DUKE LJ. 327, 341-47 (1994) . Recent legislation has been introduced by Rep. Joseph Knollenberg (R-MI) to include rightful possessors as owners under § 117. See H.R. 533, 104th Cong. (1995) . Nevertheless, because Con gress actually replaced the term "rightful possessor" with the word "owner" when drafting the legislation, it is likely that courts will be reluctant to extend § 117 to right ful possessors, including licensees.
[ Vol. 95:654 crues where the customer allows the ISO to use the software while ser vicing the computer as long as the customer activates the computer and loads the software into RAM.32
These problems would be avoided if the courts considered the ISO's use of a computer's operating software "copied" into RAM to be a "fair use" of the software.33 Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, a user may create copies of a copyrighted work without violating the Copyright Act if the user's activities constitute a "fair use. "34 The stat-32. The court in Tr iad I suggested that no copyright infringement would occur where the customer starts up the computer before the ISO arrives or where an ISO rep resentative instructs the customer "to start up or reset the computer whenever necessary to perform various service functions." Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539 -FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994 . Thus, an ISO would not violate copyright law by borrowing the customer to tum on the computer and punch the necessary keys to boot up the service software because any copy made by the customer would be permitted under the license. But see Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 367 (holding that the customer/licensee infringes on the copyright by permit ting third party access to the software). [Vol. 95:654 This Part argues . that the fair use defense should be available to ISOs against a Peak claim because the four statutory fair use factors,39 particularly the market impact factor, on balance weigh in favor of fair use. Section I.A discusses market impact, the most important of the four· factors,40 and contends that an ISO's use of software does not nega tively impact the market for software sales because the use is non proliferative. Section I.B submits that despite the commercial nature of an ISO's use of the software, the purpose of the use does not weigh against fair use because it lacks any negative impact on the market for sales of the software and because copying only serves as an intermedi ate step to an otherwise fair use. section I.C postulates that the nature of the copyrighted work supports fair use because operating software is a functional work41 subject to less protection under copyright law. Finally, section I.D maintains that while the software is completely copied into RAM, the reality of computer operations offers the ISO no alternative but to copy the entire work in order to use it. Therefore, the extent of the copying factor also should not weigh against fair use.
A. Market Impact
The Copyright Act directs courts to consider "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" 
Defining the Relevant Market: Excluding Potential Licensing Fees
The relevant market in a Peak claim should be the market for sales of the OEM's software. Potential licensing revenues from computer maintenance should not be included in the relevant market because do ing so in effect would extend copyright protection to the process of ser vicing computers -an uncopyrightable procedure.
Before an analysis of the market impact of a given use can begin, a court must define the parameters of the potential market in question.43
When defining the relevant market, courts focus their analysis on whether the disputed use would diminish demand for the original copy righted work.44 Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged use "supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work"45 or whether "it fulfills the demand for the original."46 Specifically, in order to protect the incentives established by copyright law -to en courage authors to bring copyrighted works to the market in the first place-courts determine whether the challenged use would have a det rim�ntal effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work "by di minishing potential sales, interfering with marketability, or usurping the An average layperson considering the issue for the first time might conclude intuitively that potential licensing fees should be included in the relevant market by reasoning as follows: assuming that loading software into RAM constitutes copyright infringement, certainly the ISO should pay the OEM for any actual use the ISO makes of the software after it has been copied into RAM. An OEM should be able to collect permission fees from an ISO just as a wrench manufacturer should be able to collect fees from a plumber who uses the wrench to service pipes because both the OEM and the wrenchmaker would ex pect to sell additional copies of their products to everyone who uses 49. In Peak, the software loaded into RAM permitted a user "to view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer." MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Com puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). However, if the software actually fixed a computer's problems by itself, there would be no great need for ISOs to service the computer.
50. In fact, there are two separate distinctions that elude the layperson. The first distinction is between "use" and "copying." Although the copying of the software from ROM to RAM is technically a "use" for infringement purposes, it is not the "use" for which the customer pays the ISO. The customer pays the ISO to service the computer; this "use" of the software to service the computer, once the copy is already in RAM, is not an infringement This Note refers to "use" in the latter sense.
The second distinction deals with the way in which the copying and use are "un authorized." The use (in the servicing-computers sense) is unauthorized for the cus tomer as a matter of contract law -the contract is the license agreement between the OEM and the customer. Therefore, because the ISO is not privy to the license agree ment, the use (in the servicing-computers sense) is not "unauthorized" for the ISO. On the other hand, because the ISO's copying of the software from ROM to RAM is a po tential copyright infringement, the copying is unauthorized for the ISO as a matter of scope of the licenses at issue in a Peak claim, which prohibit third-party use of the software, with the reach of copyright law. Copyright law pre vents the creation of an alternative market for copies of copyrighted works by parties other than the copyright holder. Such protection pro vides copyright holders with a legitimate expectation of income from the sale of copies of the work, but does not create any expectation of gain from a third-party's use of the work. Protecting against unautho rized uses of an item like a wrench is the province of patent law, not copyright law. Thus, the relevant market under fair use analysis should include only the market for additional copies of the work, not the mar ket for uses of the work. This is why, when determining whether the fair use defense applies, courts have distinguished between copying that constitutes "simple exploitation of another's creative efforts" and copy ing incident to the use of the copyrighted material -only the former being prohibited by copyright law.51
Both the layperson and the OEM err by concluding that the use of the copy of software in RAM detracts from the value of the original, thereby treating the creation and use of a copy of software in RAM the same as making copies of a newspaper article on a Xerox machine for use instead of the original. By doing so, they fail to recognize the unique characteristics of copying software into RAM. An item loadf'.d into RAM is an "ephemeral" copy that only exists in RAM for as long as the computer is turned on while the original remains permanently stored in some form of long-term memory.52 When the computer is 52. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 43-44. Indeed, commentators have sharply criticized the ruling in Peak for completely misconstruing the meaning of the term "fixed copy." See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 31, at 334 (arguing that because a computer program in RAM is "a transitory and ephemeral writing, like a message writ ten in sand," it should not be considered "fixed in the same way a program copied onto permanent, read-only memory (ROM) is") (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclud- [Vol. 95:654 turned off, the infonnation in RAM is erased.53 Because software only can be used in RAM, copying software into RAM does not create a real, additional copy of the software that can be used instead of the original, unlike copies of, say, a newspaper article that can serve as a substitute for the original.
In addition, the market impact of a given use should be gauged only for the potential market of the copyrightable product, not the mar ket for related but uncopyrightable activities.s4 Processes, functions, and uses are not copyrightable.ss In particular, the process of servicing a computer, even when such a process relies on the use of copyrighted software, is not copyrightable.56 Alternatively, one can copyright ing that software in RAM represents a "fixed" copy of the same software in ROM or on a hard disk is similar to ,arguing that a person's shadow represents a copy of that per son because it can be seen around the corner before the person comes into view. 55. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or em bodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) .
The Copyright Act does grant copyright holders copyright protection on works de rived from the work with the original copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); NIMMER & NIMMER , supra note 34, § 13.05 [A] [4]. The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works ... or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). However, a de rivative work must meet the same standards as an original work to receive copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) . Thus, processes, even if derived from a copy rightable work, do not qualify as derivative works subject to copyright protection.
56. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539 -FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994) (stating that because the OEM's "copy rights do not extend to the methods, procedures, and processes involved in servicing" a computer manufactured by the OEM, injury to the OEM's "position in the service mar ket is not c;ognizable under copyright law"); see also H.R REP. No. 94-1476, at 57, re printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the [computer] programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of copyright law"). OEMs do not de serve copyright protection over the process of servicing computers when such service involves the use of copyrighted diagnostic software despite the substantial investment of time, money, and labor they may have put into the development of the software. The Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Te l. Serv. Co., 490 U.S. 340 (1991), rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine and held that substantial effort alone cannot confer copyright status on an otherwise uncopyrightable work.
software designed to perform a diagnostic service, but one cannot copy right the process by which one uses the software because computer maintenance is a process without authorship. Thus, the only relevant market courts should consider is the market for sales of the software, the sole market in which an ISO could usurp the demand for the copy rightable work. Courts should not include in the relevant market the business of servicing computers and the potential licensing fees that would be generated by requiring ISOs to pay for the use of licensed software.
Copyright protection does not provide any expectation of recoup ing software development costs from computer maintenance activities, regardless of .how the OEM wishes to recover those costs. OEMs can recover the cost of development by charging higher prices for copies of their software, but should not be able to recoup those costs through ser vice contracts by operation of copyright law. As a result, the software price would reflect its true cost instead of forcing the customer to pay part of the cost of the software through the OEM's higher service rates. S. 569, 593 (1994) . The Court . noted that while a copyright holder could assert harm to the potential market for li censes of the work, the appropriate inquiry remains "the harm of market substitution." 510 U.S. at 593. In Peak claims, the market for licensing fees from ISOs to service computers is neither part of the traditional or normal market, which consists of the market for software sales, nor part of the market pro tected by copyright because the use of the software occurs as part of the uncopyrightable process of servicing computers. Even if one could ar-65. See supra notes 31-32. 66. When analyzing market impact, the equitable goals of the fair use doctrine call for striking a balance between the public benefit derived by permitting the disputed use and the per sonal gain to the copyright owner that will result from denying the use. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) . The less impact a disputed use will have on the copyright holder's legitimate expectations of personal gain from own ership of the copyright, the "less public benefit need be shown to justify the use. cannot declare a use to be an infringement unless" there is already a market in existence "to be harmed. "7 0 A potential licensing market that is either "unrealized" or "cumbersome" to enforce should not be in cluded in the relevant market.71 In a Peak claim, the potential market for licensing fees only exists after the court denies the fair use defense, not before, and thus should not be included in the relevant market be cause it is an "unrealized" market.
Evidence 73. See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *84-88 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[i]t is circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee therefore required, on the basis that the publisher is otherwise depr ived of a fee"). Although the en bane majority opinion rejected the "circularity" argument, the court limited its con sideration of lost permission fe es to revenues generated by "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed" licensing markets. See Princeton Un iversity Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-17 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994)). Consequently, the holding in Princeton Un iversity Press should not alter the market impact analysis for a Peak claim. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
In Princeton Un iversity Press, publishers sued a copying service for copyright in fringement for reproducing portions of the publishers' copyrighted work as part of "coursepack s" used by professors to make materials available to the students. The pub lishers claimed that the copying service fa iled to pay a permission fee to the publishers. See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *1-2. Finding a negative market impact resulting from the loss of permission fees, the court concluded that the circularity argument proved too much:
Imagine that the defendants set up a printing press and made exact reproductions -asserting that such reproductions constituted "fair use" -of a book to which they did not hold the copyright. Under the defendants' logic it would be circular for the copyright holder to argue market harm because of lost copyright revenues, since this would assume that the copyright holder had a right to such revenues. Princeton Un iversity Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-14.
·671
use of a work negatively impacts the value of the copyrighted work, not just that the user's failure to pay royalties causes a loss of revenue to which the copyright holder may or may not have b�n entitled in the first place.
Lack of Impact on the Relevant Market
Because ISOs do not compete with OEMs for the sale of operating software, market impact, the most significant fair use factor,74 weighs in favor of a finding of fair use. Although an ISO competes against an OEM in the computer maintenance field, that arena does not comprise part of the market for copies of the software. Copying of software into RAM by an ISO, unlike copying of copyrightable material in general, does not in any way reduce the customer's demand for that software be cause the copying is nonproliferative. Even when a copy of software exists in RAM, that copy cannot be distributed anywhere else.75 Anyone who wants a copy of the software for a different use either would have The majority's argument, however, confuses the impact on the market for permis sion fe es with the impact on the market for, or the value of, the original work. Making exact reproductions of a book on a printing press undoubtedly would have a negative impact on the market for the book and thus would not qualify as a fair use regardless of any impact on permission fe es. The problem with the majority's logic in Princeton Uni versity Press is that it "would always yield a conclusion that the market had been harmed because any fe es that a copyright holder could extract from a user if the use were found to be unfair would be 'lost' if the use were instead found to be 'fair use.' " Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *86 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Market impact analysis concerns itself with whether the use in question damages the value of the original work or damages the value of derivative products such as cour sepacks that the copyright holder wishes to market, not whether the use deprives the copyright holder of per mission fe es. See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *84-85 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Because permission fe es are what should be paid if the use is found to be unfair, and consequently should not be paid if the use is fair, the question of lost permission fees should not be considered until after the court determines whether the use is fair. Significantly, a distinguished group of copyright law professors filed an amicus curiae brief in Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ). However, any copy of the software in RAM would not have an independent existence that could be transferred into permanent form for use on the customer's computer. As a result, the customer could not avoid purchasing a copy of the software by mak ing a copy of the software in RAM. LJ. 593, 608 (1995) . This analysis also would apply to copies made on disk or tape for archival purposes because such copies are made only as backups in case the computer malfunctions during servicing and are destroyed after the maintenance process is com plete. See discussion supra note 19. Of course, the analysis should only apply as long as the ISO destroys and does not proliferate those copies in a way that supplants the mar ket for the original software. The fair use defense would not protect an ISO's prolifera tive activities from the reach of copyr igh t law.
77. See Playboy Enterps., Inc. v. Frena, 839"F. Supp. 1552 , 1558 -59 (M.D. Fla. 1993 .
78. See Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Maph ia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994) . 79. Unlike other copyrighted work s such as book s that "need not be copied by the re ader ... to be used," computer programs "must be copied to be used by the com puter and hence, the user." Stovsky, supra note 76, at 595 (citing RAYMOND T. NIMME R, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-103 (2d ed. 1992)).
80. The analysis would be the same even if the operating system software and util ity software were decoupled from each other because the lack of market impact and the customer's necessity in using the software to operate the customer's computer success fully would remain unchanged. In other words, although the utility/service software would no longer be copied automatically into RAM whenever the computer was turned on, the copying would still be necessary to perform the maintenance on the computer and an ISO's use of the software would not alter the customer's demand for the software. In these cases, courts have found fair use because the defendant's use of the software codes through reverse engineering did not coinpete directly' with the plaintiff 's sales of the software codes.84 In both a Peak case and a reverse engmeering case, although copying occurs, the copy ing does not create additional marketable copies of the software. Rather, it is a necessary step in the use of the software for purposes that do not adversely affect the demand for the software.85 Indeed, the existence of 81. See, e.g., Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992 569, 579 (1994) (stressing the importance of the transformative nature of the use as a strong factor for finding in favor of fa ir use). However, focusing solely on whether a given use is transformative is perilously shortsighted. First, a use need not be transform ative to be a fa ir use. For example, the copying of an article by a teacher to use in class, one of the examples of fair use listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994), would not be consid ered a transformative use. Second, the cour t in Tr iad II relied on its inquiry into the question of whether the use is transformative as an intermediate step in determining market impact of the use. See Tr iad II, 64 F.3d at 1336. The relevant software market in a Peak claim, however, suffers no harm as a result of the ISO's use. Analyzing whether the use is transformative as a way of measuring market impact would be a misguided enterprise if a lack of market impact had already been established through an indepen dent analysis.
[Vol. 95:654 competition in the service market for a given computer system likely will enhance, not suppress, the demand for that system. 8 6
B. Purpose of the Use
Section 107 also directs courts to consider the "purpose and char acter of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit education purposes" when evaluating the fairness of a challenged use.87 The Supreme Court has ruled that "every commer cial use of copyrighted material" creates a rebuttable presumption of an unfair use.88 An ISO's commercial use of operating software thus cre ates a presumption of unfair use.89 Nevertheless, despite this negative presumption, a commercial use still may constitute a fair use if it has no effect on the market for the copyxjghted material.9 0 Consequently, while the purpose of the use factor may not weigh in favor of fair use, it
should not weigh against fair use either because an ISO's commercial gain from the use of the software does not detract in any way from the OEM's profits from sales of the software.
An analysis of the commercial nature of a given use should be used to help determine the extent to which the infringing copy "super sedes" the original work.91 Courts investigate whether the user stands to profit from her exploitation of the copyrighted material in a way that di- 89. The court in Advanced Computer Services concluded that the commercial pur pose of an ISO's use of copyrighted software weighed "substantially against" a finding of fa ir use. The court concluded that the ISO's commercial use of copyrighted software is "an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the holder of the copyright" 845 F. Supp. at 365 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
90. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589-95; see also Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522 (hold ing that the presumption of unfairness arising from a commercial use "can be rebutted by the characteristics of the particular commercial use").
91. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a commercial use automatically establishes an unfair use. See 510 U.S. at 584; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F. 3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) (although fa ir use is "presumptively" unavailable where the use is commer cial, " 'presumptively' does not mean 'always', and, in any event, the doctrine of fa ir use .
•. can be adapted to new purposes"), affd . by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) . The Supreme Court, quoting Samuel Johnson, has noted th at "[n]o man but WL 446049, at *11 (N.D. Cal: Mar. 18, 1994) . Commercial uses that result in public benefit may qualify as fair uses. See Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1523; MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) . ISOs have claimed that their ability to use copyrighted software in a Peak claim benefits customers who own computers using licensed software by providing those customers with "a choice and price competition in the ser vice and maintenance markets." Tr iad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *11.
Public benefit, though, "typically involves 'the development of art, science, and industry . . . and not, as here, the purely financial interests of customers." Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994 ) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Thus, despite the financial benefits bestowed to customers by an ISO's ability to service their computers, courts likely will find that the public benefit exception does not apply to Peak claims. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Serv., 845 F. Supp. at 365 (concluding that the public benefit exception did not apply because "customers, having signed license agreements, were on notice that they could not allow third parties to use the software"); see also Tr iad II, 64 F.3d at 1337 (detecting "no ap preciable public benefit" arising from enhanced competition in the computer service market that would justify a finding of fair use). Nevertheless, an ISO's public benefit argument highlights the fact that an ISO's ability to use the software likely serves to en hance rather than detract from the software's value. This result bolsters the case that the commercial nature of an ISO's use should not weigh against fair use because it does not have any detrimental impact on the value of the original work.
95. [Vol. 95:654 fair use should be applied more freely to the copying of "informa tional," "functional," or "factual" works than to "creative" works, be cause allowing users to copy more functional works does not threaten to undermine the incentives copyright law creates to promote advances in the arts and sciences.98 In a Peak claim, the nature of the work should weigh in favor of fair use because operating software is prima rily a functional work undeserving of a high degree of copyright protection.
Although courts have agreed that operating software is used for a functional purpose,99 they are split on the issue of whether computer software deserves a higher or lower degree of copyright protection. 1 00
On the one hand, the recent trend in fair use software cases has been to apply a lower degree of protection to computer software, 101 especially 569, 586 (1994) . This analysis comports with the underlying purpose of copyright law. The Constitution provides that copyr ight law shall serve to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Wr itings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "To this end, copyright assures the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information con veyed by a work . " Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991 Supp. 449, 457-59 (N.D. Ga. 1987) and Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison Wo rld, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 , 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1986 ) (extending a high degree of copyr ight protection to all aspects of a computer program, including its functional characteristics) with Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1995, at 11 (observing that although the "trend in caselaw in the mid to late 1980s seemed to 'zig' in favor of an expansive scope of copyright protection for programs, the trend in the early 1990s has been to 'zag' toward a narrower scope of protection"). Many recent commentators have argued in favor of where the software is primarily a "functional" work.102 In particular, the court in Triad I ruled that operating system software is a functional, utilitarian work. 1 0 3 Other courts have concluded that software deserves a high degree of copyright protection because it "is not a mere compila tion of existing information ... [but] is instead a specially designed and crafted work which represents a substantial investment of time and labor. " 104 Nevertheless, because of its functional nature, operating software should receive less protection than creative works such as poems or novels under fair use analysis. Operating software ensures the effective operation of the computer so that it can perform the tasks for which it was designed. Operating software, including operating system software and utility software, is essentially utilitarian, and it should not merit a high enough degree of protection to weigh against a finding of fair use.1os
However, the court in Triad I distinguished between operating sys tem software and utility/diagnostic software, providing greater protec tion to the latter. 106 The court in Triad I, reasoning that the computer could operate without utility/service software but could not function without operating system software, concluded that diagnostic software was not "clearly functional" and deserved greater protection than oper- [Vol. 95:654 ating system software.107 Consequently, the court found the nature of the work Wyighed against the fair use of service software because such software was not "clearly functional." tos The court in Triad I, though, improperly departed from its own standards. The court considered operating system software to be "func tional" and to deserve a lower degree of protection because of the rela tionship between operating system software and "any productive use of the computer." 109 Utility software, like operating system software, plays an essential role in insuring that the computer functions properly. The customer does not purchase a computer to run utility software. Instead, the customer purchases a computer to run certain application software and buys the utility/s ervice software only to make sure that the com puter can continue to run the application software. In other words, util ity software ensures that the computer can operate but does not perform the functions for which the computer was designed. It is not an "elec tive" component because without it the computer could not continue to function.
Because it is designed as an essential component in ensuring that the computer operates properly and does not perform any "productive use of the computer," utility/s ervice software should receive the same, lower level of protection afforded to operating system software. Operat ing software, including both operating system software and util ity/diagnostic software, is supportive of the computer's main functions, such as managing memory, checking for and displaying errors, listing the files on a disk, formatting a diskette, and coordinating processing functions. Supp. 356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994 ) (citing McGowan v. Cross, No. 92-1480 , No. 92-1584 , 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9134, at *4-*5 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1993 ).
114. See Advanced Comp uter Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365-66 (arguing that copying the entire program into RAM weighs against fai r use); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539 -FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994 .
115. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994) ; Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 , 1526 -27 (9th Cir. 1992 (noting that wholesale reproduction of a copyrighted work may be per mitted as a fair use when a user can only make use of the work by copying all of it); see also NIMME R & NIMME R, supra note 34, § 13.05 [D] [4].
116. Any evaluation of the fair use defense must be circumscribed by the equita ble demands of the fair use doctrine and guided by an understanding of the underlying [Vol. 95:654 serve only as examples to aid the courts' analyses of whether a given use is fair; they do not serve as an "exhaustive enumeration" nor do they provide "a rule that may automatically be applied in deciding whether any particular use is 'fair. ' "117 Fair use analysis under section 107 "is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis." 11 8
The importance of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Peak cannot be overstated. Under the guise of copyright law, the Peak decision allows OEMs to reserve "an exclusive right to service the hardware on which the software runs," effectively extending their copyright monopoly on the software they produce into the computer service market.119 Because an ISO must be able to tum on a computer while servicing it, 1 2 0 denying purpose of copyright law. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552, 560 (1986) . Fair use enables courts to avoid stifling "the very creativ ity" copyright law seeks to foster by protecting uses of copied material that further the goals of copyright law. Campbell, 510 U. S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 236 (1990) 57, 60 (1994) (stating that the decision in Peak has "cast doubt on the viability of the independent service organization (ISO) industry"); Richard L. Goff, Can Software Copyrights Restrict Related Competition?, COMPUTER LAW., Oct 1994, at 9 (arguing that a "combination of copyright protection and well-drafted software license limita tions may lawfully accomplish some restrictions on competition" in the computer ser vice market); Levin, supra note 20, at 67 1-73 & n.167.
122. If copyright protection applies, OEMs clearly have the unfettered ability to preclude ISOs from performing computer maintenance by refusing to sell them software licenses without violating antitrust laws. See infra note 123. However, if loading software into RAM by an ISO did not create a "copy" of the software or did not con stitute an infringing copy because the fair use defense applied, any attempt by an OEM to force the customer to hire only . the OEM for computer maintenance likely would run afoul of antitrust law. In order successfully to preclude customers from hiring ISOs to perform computer maintenance without the benefit of copyright protection, an OEM would need to argue that the restrictive licenses prohibited customers from using anyone other than the OEM to service the customer's computer. Such a reading, though, likely would render the contract unenforceable as an illegal tying of the sale or licensing of software to an ex clusive contract for the OEM to perform computer service on computers using the software, a practice the Supreme Court held to be a violation of antitrust law in East man Kodak Co. v. Image Te chnical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct 2072 (1992) 131. The court re asoned that since the copy of the software made into RAM was created by the customer on the customer's computer, the ISO did not copy the software even though the ISO was the one using the copy of the software via the dumb terminal. See 45 F.3d at 231. [Vo l. 95:654 whether the customer turned on the computer or whether maintenance was performed through a dumb terminal.132
Because the holding in Peak allows OEMs to extend the reach of copyright protection beyond the scope supported by the goals of copy right law, ISOs should be able to rely on fair use as a defense against a Peak claim.133 Otherwise, OEMs receive a de facto copyright on the un copyrightable process of servicing computers by licensing rather than selling operating software to their customers. CONCLUSION "Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit." 134 In order to insure the most effective application of copyright law in the relatively new arena of computer software litigation, courts should strive to remain faithful to the fundamental aims of copyright law and the equitable principles underlying the fair use doctrine. Courts should allow ISOs to rely on the fair use defense in a Peak claim because the fa ir use factors on bal ance weigh in favor of a finding of fair use: the commercial purpose of an ISO's use of the operating software is offset by the fact that the use has no negative market impact, the operating software is primarily a functional and not a creative work, and an ISO has no viable alternative but to copy the entirety of a computer's operating software when turn ing on the computer. Such a decision also would make sense on policy grounds: courts should not allow OEMs to monopolize unfairly the 132. Application of the fa ir use doctrine in a Peak claim would not infringe on an OEM's legitimate use of software licensing agreements such as ensuring that customers have to upgrade the software each time the OEM releases a new version. However, con sidering an ISO's use of the software to be fair would protect customers and ISOs from the improper use of licensing agreements designed to prohibit competition in the com puter maintenance market In addition, the fair use defense in Peak claims would allow the continued application of the Peak doctrine in cases where it may make sense, such as prohibiting third pa rti es from loading data or pictures into RAM that can be used as a substitute to the purchase of the original (i.e. reading a book displayed in RAM that is stored in ROM instead of buying an additional copy). For a discussion of the potential implications of copyright law on the growing number of works accessible through com puters that can be perceived in RAM see Jane C. Ginsbutg, Putting Cars on the "Infor mation Sup erhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cy berspace, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1466 REv. (1995 .
133. The courts that have held otherwise demonstrate what one commentator de scribed as the process by which "a series of legal determinations, each somewhat de fensible as a mechanical application of statutory language and case law precedent, can yield a result that is plainly at odds with the policies behind the statute it seeks to ap ply. " Johnson, supra note 31, at 328. computer service market by relying on copyright protection to stifle competition in the related but uncopyrightable field of computer maintenance.
Critics may argue that using the fair use defense to avoid the im plications of the decision in Peak is nothing more than a subterfuge, an attempt to circumvent a controversial ruling by relying on a convenient but inappropriate doctrine. However, because the issues raised by a Peak claim involve equitable claims about the valid scope of copyright protection on software and the fairness of extending that protection to the uncopyrightable work of servicing computers, fair use is an appro priate defense. Fair use serves as a safety valve to avoid the conse quences of strictly applying copyright law in certain situations when such an application would contravene the fundamental purposes of cop yright law.135 Thus, fa ir use should be available as a defense to a Peak claim to offset the inequitable results that would flow from a strict ap plication of the Peak doctrine.
135. See Rice, supra note 105, at 1131 (arguing that fair use is an appropriate doc trine to avoid the unfair results of strictly applying copyright law when dealing with computer software).
